In 1762 a Protestant merchant named Jean Calas was stretched on the strappado sixteen times in a Toulouse courtroom until his shoulders gave way and he confessed to murdering his own son. The confession was false, the son had taken his own life, and Calas was broken on the wheel and killed. That single case, and others like it, forced Europe to confront a practice that had shaped criminal justice for centuries: the routine use of pain to produce evidence.

This article traces how judicial torture, once accepted as a normal tool of the courts, was challenged and largely dismantled during the Enlightenment. We look at the long history of the practice, the high-profile miscarriages of justice that exposed its flaws, the writers who turned those failures into arguments for reform, and the legal changes that followed. We also consider what those changes mean for the way investigations are conducted today.

The Long Reliance on Pain as Proof

Judicial torture did not appear suddenly in the Middle Ages. Roman law had allowed it against slaves and non-citizens, but the practice expanded sharply after the thirteenth century when the Catholic Church authorised its use in heresy trials. Secular courts soon adopted the same methods for ordinary crimes. By the early modern period, torture was embedded in legal codes across much of the continent. A confession obtained under duress was treated as reliable evidence, and the threat of further pain was expected to deter others.

The logic was simple and brutal. Investigators believed that only the guilty would endure extreme suffering without confessing. In practice the opposite often happened. People confessed to crimes they had not committed simply to stop the pain. A sixteenth-century French jurist observed that torture made the innocent appear as guilty as the guilty. Public executions that followed these confessions were meant to reinforce order, yet they also revealed how easily the system could be turned against political or religious targets.

Two Cases That Showed the System at Work

In 1307 King Philip IV of France moved against the Knights Templar, an order to which he owed large sums. The knights were accused of heresy and subjected to burning, crushing, and confinement in iron cages. Many confessed under torture, and Grand Master Jacques de Molay was burned at the stake. The episode is now recognised as a politically driven fabrication in which torture supplied the required evidence.

Three centuries later, in 1629, the priest Urbain Grandier was accused of causing demonic possession among nuns in Loudun. He was subjected to the water cure and leg-crushing boots until he confessed. He was burned at the stake. Later inquiries pointed to personal and political motives behind the accusations, including the hostility of Cardinal Richelieu. These were not isolated scandals. They were extreme examples of routine procedure that affected thieves, beggars, and suspected witches as well as prominent figures.

Enlightenment Arguments Take Shape

By the middle of the eighteenth century a different way of thinking about evidence and punishment was gaining ground. Writers began to ask whether pain could ever produce trustworthy information and whether the state had the right to inflict it on people who had not yet been convicted. The most influential statement came from an Italian nobleman, Cesare Beccaria. His short book On Crimes and Punishments, published anonymously in 1764, argued that torture was both unreliable and unnecessary. He asked how certainty could be obtained from a procedure that began with uncertainty about guilt. Beccaria also called for proportionate punishments and a presumption of innocence. His ideas circulated widely and reached several European rulers.

Voltaire Turns a Local Injustice into a European Cause

Voltaire gave the argument a human face through the Calas case. After Calas was executed, Voltaire collected evidence that the son had died by suicide and that anti-Protestant prejudice had driven the prosecution. He published his findings in the Treatise on Tolerance in 1763 and petitioned the French court. In 1765 Calas was exonerated posthumously. The victory showed that public pressure, backed by documented evidence, could overturn a verdict obtained by torture. Voltaire repeated the same approach in the case of the young nobleman Jean-François de La Barre, who was executed in 1766 for alleged blasphemy on the basis of tortured witness statements. These campaigns turned individual miscarriages into arguments for systemic change.

Other Voices and the Spread of Reform

Montesquieu had already questioned torture in The Spirit of the Laws in 1748, noting that prolonged pain simply broke a person’s capacity to resist. Denis Diderot’s Encyclopédie recorded the variety of devices and the frequency of their use. In England, Jeremy Bentham applied utilitarian principles, asking whether torture served any useful purpose in preventing crime. The arguments travelled through books, pamphlets, and private correspondence. In 1786 the Grand Duke of Tuscany abolished torture. France followed in 1789, and Prussia codified the ban in 1794.

From European Courts to New Legal Standards

The same ideas shaped the legal framework of the new United States. The Bill of Rights, ratified in 1791, included protections against self-incrimination that reflected Beccaria’s concerns. In practice this meant a gradual shift toward evidence that did not depend on a confession: witness statements taken without coercion, medical examinations, and later forensic techniques. Nineteenth-century police forces in Britain and elsewhere began to develop methods of investigation that did not rely on physical pressure.

The change was never complete or uniform. Colonial administrations continued to use coercive methods, and the Spanish Inquisition did not formally end until 1834. In the twentieth century, international agreements such as the UN Convention Against Torture in 1984 restated the principle that states may not inflict severe pain to obtain information. Cases of extraordinary rendition and so-called enhanced interrogation in recent decades show that the old temptation to treat pain as a shortcut has not disappeared entirely.

Why the Change Still Matters

The Enlightenment critique did more than remove a procedure. It altered the standard of proof. Once torture was rejected, investigators had to gather evidence that could stand on its own. That requirement lies behind modern requirements for corroboration, recorded interviews, and scientific testing. When contemporary cases reveal coerced confessions, as the Innocence Project has documented in hundreds of DNA exonerations since 1989, the same arguments Beccaria made in 1764 are still relevant. The principle that the state must prove guilt without destroying the suspect remains the foundation of any system that claims to be just.

At Dyerbolical we examine how these historical shifts continue to shape the way true crime stories are investigated and told. The move away from judicial torture did not end all forms of coercion, but it established a standard against which later practices could be judged.

Bibliography

Beccaria, Cesare. On Crimes and Punishments. 1764.

Voltaire. Treatise on Tolerance. 1763.

Montesquieu. The Spirit of the Laws. 1748.

Peters, Edward. Torture. University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996.

Langbein, John H. Torture and the Law of Proof. University of Chicago Press, 1977.

UN General Assembly. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 1984.

Innocence Project. DNA Exonerations in the United States. Ongoing database.

Lea, Henry Charles. A History of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages. 1888.

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