Sudan’s long-running conflicts have produced a grim pattern where the same faces keep returning to power and the same tactics keep claiming civilian lives. This article looks at how three men, former president Omar al-Bashir, Rapid Support Forces leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo known as Hemedti, and Sudanese Armed Forces commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, have each played central roles in waves of violence that stretch from the Darfur genocide of the early 2000s to the fighting that erupted in Khartoum in 2023.
The story begins long before any of these men held top positions. Sudan gained independence in 1956 after British and Egyptian rule ended, yet the new state inherited deep divisions between the Arab-Muslim north and the African south. Two civil wars followed, killing millions and setting a template in which leaders turned to armed groups and scorched-earth tactics whenever they felt threatened. Oil discoveries in the south only sharpened those tensions, because whoever controlled the fields also controlled revenue that could fund militias.
Historical Roots of Sudan’s Fractured Conflicts
By the time rebels in Darfur rose up in 2003, the idea that Khartoum would answer challenges with proxy fighters was already well established. The Sudan Liberation Army and Justice and Equality Movement accused the government of neglect and demanded fair shares of power and resources. Instead of negotiations, the response was to arm local Arab militias that became known as the Janjaweed. Those early attacks on non-Arab villages showed how quickly local grievances could be turned into systematic campaigns of destruction.
The Darfur Genocide: A Blueprint for Atrocities
Between 2003 and 2005 roughly 300,000 people died and 2.7 million were forced from their homes. The pattern was brutally consistent: Janjaweed fighters on horseback, supplied with government weapons and sometimes backed by air strikes, burned villages, killed men and boys, and raped women and girls. Survivors described water wells poisoned with corpses and entire families locked inside huts that were then set on fire. The United Nations called the events genocide in 2004. The label mattered because it triggered legal obligations, yet the killing continued in cycles, each wave followed by official denials and then renewed operations once international attention faded.
Omar al-Bashir: The Architect of State-Sponsored Terror
Omar al-Bashir took power in a 1989 coup backed by Islamist allies. He ruled for three decades, using the army, intelligence services and tribal militias to stay in control. Early in his time in office he crushed southern rebel movements and displaced whole communities. Darfur became the clearest example of how he turned serial violence into state policy.
Rise, Rule, and Darfur’s Reckoning
Intelligence records later showed that al-Bashir personally authorised the arming of Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal. Rape was used as a deliberate weapon; Human Rights Watch documented thousands of cases, including attacks on children as young as five. The International Criminal Court opened an investigation in 2005 and in 2009 issued arrest warrants for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Al-Bashir remained free for years by travelling only to countries that did not recognise the court’s authority, which underlined how weak enforcement mechanisms still are when powerful states choose not to cooperate.
Fall from Power and Limited Justice
Mass protests in 2018 and 2019 finally forced him from office amid economic collapse. He was arrested and later convicted in Sudan on corruption charges, yet the Darfur cases remain stalled. Extradition to The Hague has never happened, leaving survivors without the full accounting they were promised. The partial justice he received shows how domestic trials can remove a leader while still shielding him from the gravest accusations.
Hemedti and the Rapid Support Forces: From Janjaweed to Warlords
Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemedti, started as a camel trader and rose through the Janjaweed ranks. He earned a reputation for ruthlessness during operations such as the 2004 attack on Tawila that left around 200 people dead. When al-Bashir needed a more organised force, he turned the Janjaweed into the Rapid Support Forces in 2013 and placed Hemedti in command.
Genesis of the RSF
The RSF gained wealth by controlling gold mines in Darfur, money that paid fighters and bought political influence. After al-Bashir fell, Hemedti joined the transitional Sovereign Council alongside civilian leaders. That alliance collapsed in April 2023 when he clashed with army chief al-Burhan over plans to absorb the RSF into the regular military. The fighting that followed spread the same tactics seen in Darfur two decades earlier into West Darfur and the capital itself. In June 2023 alone, UN investigators recorded more than 400 Masalit deaths in El Geneina, accompanied by widespread rape and mutilation.
Allegations of Serial Atrocities
Amnesty International reports describe repeated patterns of ethnic cleansing. Hemedti has denied direct orders and blamed rogue elements, yet the chain of command runs straight through his headquarters. His public appearances in Gulf capitals stand in sharp contrast to the destruction reported on the ground, illustrating how warlords can maintain international contacts even while facing serious allegations.
Abdel Fattah al-Burhan: The SAF’s Role in Perpetual Conflict
General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan led the Sudanese Armed Forces after the 2019 transition. His decision to resist full integration of the RSF helped trigger the 2023 war. SAF airstrikes have hit civilian neighbourhoods in Khartoum, and reports from the United Nations detail looting and sexual violence by government troops as well. While the RSF draws most attention for militia-style killings, the army’s refusal to break old alliances with Islamist groups has kept the conflict grinding on, with daily civilian casualties sometimes exceeding one hundred during intense periods.
Patterns of Serial Violence: A Criminological Lens
Looking across the decades, the same elements appear again and again. Leaders label targeted groups as rebels or outsiders, which makes extreme violence seem acceptable to their own supporters. Rape is deployed in almost every major campaign, with more than 500 cases documented in Khartoum in 2023 alone. Control of gold, farmland and water keeps providing the economic fuel for each new round of fighting. Psychologically, the pattern suggests that once violence becomes a reliable tool for holding power, it is hard for any single leader to abandon it without risking his own position.
Related conflicts in South Sudan after 2011 independence show how easily these habits cross borders when armed groups and resource disputes are left unresolved. Neighbouring countries have sometimes supplied weapons or hosted exiles, which further prolongs the suffering.
Investigations, Trials, and Global Response
The ICC case against al-Bashir remains open, and other Darfur figures such as Ali Kushayb were arrested in 2020 and are now on trial. Hybrid courts planned inside Sudan collapsed amid renewed fighting. Recent United States sanctions on specific RSF commanders involved in the El Geneina killings show that targeted pressure can still be applied, yet broader enforcement is inconsistent. Local groups like the Darfur Bar Association continue to collect testimony from survivors, preserving evidence that may matter if political conditions ever allow fuller prosecutions. More than 33 million people now need humanitarian aid, a figure that grows each time fighting blocks relief corridors.
Legacy: An Unbroken Chain of Carnage
Al-Bashir sits in a Sudanese prison, Hemedti controls large parts of the west, and al-Burhan still directs the army from Port Sudan. The cycle has not been broken. Famine threatens up to 25 million people if harvests fail again. Real change would require steady international pressure, credible local reconciliation efforts, and trials that reach the planners rather than only the foot soldiers. Without those steps the same script is likely to be replayed by the next generation of commanders.
Observers at Dyerbolical have tracked how these power struggles keep reshaping Sudan’s political landscape, and the pattern remains clear: accountability delayed is accountability denied for the victims who cannot wait another decade.
Bibliography
United Nations Human Rights Council reports on Darfur and the 2023 conflict.
Human Rights Watch, “Darfur: A Decade of Suffering” and later updates.
International Criminal Court arrest warrants and trial records for Omar al-Bashir and Ali Kushayb.
Amnesty International documentation of RSF operations in West Darfur, 2023.
Comprehensive Peace Agreement texts and subsequent implementation reviews.
Reuters and BBC reporting on casualty figures and displacement since April 2023.
United States Treasury sanctions announcements targeting RSF commanders.
Darfur Bar Association statements and survivor testimonies collected since 2003.
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