In 1933 a Welsh journalist named Gareth Jones walked through Ukrainian villages where entire families had already vanished, their homes stripped bare and their fields silent. That same pattern of engineered collapse repeated itself decades later under Mao in China and then under Mengistu in Ethiopia. Each ruler took a country already strained by poverty or war and deliberately pushed its rural population past the point of survival. The result was not a single tragedy but three separate catastrophes that together claimed well over sixty million lives.
This article looks at how those decisions were made, what the leaders hoped to gain, and why the consequences still shape the countries involved today. It draws on declassified records, survivor accounts, and later historical research to show that these famines were not simple accidents of weather or mismanagement. They were policies carried out with full knowledge of the human cost.
Joseph Stalin: Architect of the Holodomor
Joseph Stalin was born Ioseb Jughashvili in 1878 in Georgia and rose through the Bolshevik movement by combining ruthless ambition with a talent for organisation. By the late 1920s he had eliminated rivals and set the Soviet Union on a course of forced industrialisation. The First Five-Year Plan required grain to be taken from the countryside to feed factory workers and to earn foreign currency through exports. When peasants resisted the loss of their land and livestock, Stalin labelled them class enemies and ordered their removal.
The Holodomor, the Ukrainian famine of 1932-1933, grew directly from those orders. Ukraine produced much of the Soviet grain surplus, yet the state demanded deliveries that exceeded what the disrupted farms could possibly supply. When villages fell short, officials blacklisted them, sealed borders, and sent armed teams to search homes for any remaining food. The policy trapped people inside regions already running out of supplies and prevented outside help from reaching them.
The Mechanics of Starvation
Grain targets kept rising even as harvests fell. In 1932 Ukraine was told to hand over 7.7 million tons despite clear signs of shortage. At the same time grain continued to leave the country for sale abroad. Families survived on grass, tree bark, and whatever small animals they could catch. Reports of cannibalism reached Soviet archives after 1991, and children in particular showed the physical signs of prolonged hunger that locals called dzhaga. Death estimates for Ukraine alone range from 3.5 to 7 million, with some districts losing a quarter of their population in a single year.
Survivors later described to researchers at the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute how they watched neighbours die and how daily burials became routine. Stalin refused to acknowledge the famine publicly and instead blamed saboteurs. It was not until the 1980s that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev allowed open discussion, and Ukraine formally recognised the events as genocide in 2006. Sixteen other countries have since done the same, while Russia continues to reject that label.
Investigations and Stalin’s Impunity
Western reporting was mixed at the time. Gareth Jones published eyewitness accounts in 1933, but other correspondents such as Walter Duranty of The New York Times repeated Soviet claims that no famine existed. After Stalin’s death, Nikita Khrushchev’s 1956 secret speech criticised some of the purges but left the Holodomor largely untouched. Declassified security files later confirmed that orders came from the top and were carried out with the explicit aim of breaking resistance in the countryside. No trial was ever held for Stalin himself, though the legal concept of using famine as a weapon of war has since appeared in international proceedings.
Mao Zedong: The Great Leap into Famine
Mao Zedong came from a farming family in Hunan and led the communist forces to victory in 1949. Once in power he launched the Great Leap Forward in 1958, an attempt to overtake Britain’s industrial output within fifteen years through rapid collectivisation and backyard steel production. Private plots were abolished and households were merged into enormous communes. Local officials, fearing punishment, reported wildly inflated harvest figures that prompted the state to take even more grain than the land had actually produced.
The resulting famine between 1959 and 1962 remains the deadliest in recorded history. Demographer Frank Dikötter, working from provincial archives, places the death toll at around 45 million in his 2010 book Mao’s Great Famine. The campaign to kill sparrows removed natural pest control and contributed to later insect damage, while industrial demands diverted labour and fertiliser away from agriculture. When criticism surfaced at the 1959 Lushan Conference, Mao purged the critic Peng Dehuai and tightened control further.
Engineered Catastrophe
Some provinces recorded mortality rates above 15 percent. Relief was minimal because Mao insisted the crisis was caused by natural disasters rather than policy. The same pattern of denial and blame that Stalin had used appeared again. Anne Applebaum, in her study of the Ukrainian famine, notes Mao’s reported remark that it was acceptable to let half the population die so the other half could eat. After Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping introduced reforms that quietly acknowledged the scale of the failure, yet official Chinese figures still list far lower totals than independent researchers accept.
Trials and Reckoning
Mao received no formal trial. A 1981 Communist Party resolution described the Great Leap as 60 percent natural disaster and 40 percent man-made, protecting his reputation. Journalist Yang Jisheng later risked punishment to publish Tombstone in 2008, using internal documents to show how the cover-up operated at every level. Scholars continue to examine the events in what amounts to a moral accounting long after the leader’s death.
Mengistu Haile Mariam: Ethiopia’s Red Famine
Mengistu Haile Mariam, born in 1937, seized power in Ethiopia through a military coup in 1977 and ruled until 1991. His Red Terror campaign eliminated political opponents and set the tone for a regime that viewed the countryside through the same ideological lens Stalin and Mao had applied. When drought struck in the early 1980s, Mengistu’s collectivisation drives and forced resettlement of 600,000 northerners to less fertile southern lands made the situation far worse. Grain was seized for the army while aid was blocked from reaching areas controlled by rebels.
Policies of Death
The 1983-1985 famine killed between 400,000 and 1.5 million people. Mengistu spent heavily on Soviet weapons even as relief supplies arrived from abroad. The 1985 Live Aid concerts raised large sums, yet much of the aid was diverted or restricted. Human Rights Watch later documented deliberate withholding of food from Tigray and other opposition regions. Mengistu fled to Zimbabwe in 1991 and was convicted in absentia in 2006 on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity, though he has never been extradited.
Psychological Profiles and Shared Traits
All three men displayed a willingness to treat large sections of their own populations as obstacles to be removed. Stalin’s outsider background fed a deep suspicion of disloyalty. Mao’s rural origins shaped a vision of total transformation that left little room for dissent. Mengistu’s military training reinforced a belief that force could solve any political problem. In each case, bureaucrats carried out lethal orders with little personal hesitation, a pattern the philosopher Hannah Arendt described when writing about the routine nature of great evil.
The common methods are clear: forced collectivisation, unrealistic production quotas, export of food during shortage, and the sealing of borders or information channels. The victims were overwhelmingly rural and poor. The long-term effects remain visible in Ukraine’s population structure, in China’s later policy shifts, and in Ethiopia’s continuing development challenges.
Bibliography
Frank Dikötter, Mao’s Great Famine (2010)
Yang Jisheng, Tombstone (2008)
Anne Applebaum, Red Famine (2017)
Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands (2010)
Human Rights Watch reports on Ethiopia (various years)
Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute survivor collections
Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow (1986)
de Waal, Famine Crimes (1997)
At Dyerbolical we examine how these events connect to wider questions of power and accountability. The patterns are not identical, yet each shows what happens when leaders decide that certain lives can be sacrificed for an abstract goal.
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